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On	the	Boundaries	Between	Good	and	Evil:	
Constructing	Multiple	Moralities	in	China1	
	 Robert	P.	Weller	and	Keping	Wu		
ABSTRACT:		This	essay	discusses	three	contrasting	versions	of	the	relationship	between	good	and	evil	in	contemporary	China:		a	spirit	medium	who	maneuvers	between	them,	a	charismatic	Christian	group	that	forges	an	identity	by	defending	the	border	between	them,	and	an	official	state	and	religious	discourse	of	banal	goodness	and	universal	love	that	that	seeks	to	annihilate	evil.		Each	defines	good	and	evil	differently,	but	more	importantly,	each	imagines	the	nature	of	the	boundary	itself	differently	–	as	permeable	and	negotiable,	clear	and	defensible,	or	simply	intolerable.		These	varied	conceptions	help	to	shape	alternate	views	of	empathy,	pluralism,	and	the	problem	of	how	to	live	with	otherness.		Robert	P.	Weller	(rpweller@bu.edu)	is	Professor	in	Anthropology	and	Research	Associate	in	the	Institute	for	Culture,	Religion	and	World	Affairs	at	Boston	University.		Keping	Wu	(kepingwu@gmail.com)	is	Associate	Professor	in	Anthropology	at	Sun	Yat-sen	University.	
 
这满目的善，天哪，多么平庸！而恶，多么需要灵感！[This	goodness	you	see	
everywhere,	good	heavens,	how	banal	it	is!		And	evil,	how	it	needs	some	inspiration!]	
																																																									1	The	order	of	authors'	names	is	alphabetical,	and	authorship	should	be	considered	equal.	
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--西川	[Xi	Chuan],Ying	de	Huayu	鹰的话语	[What	the	Eagle	Says],	#45,	1999	
	
	While	doing	fieldwork	in	2014,	we	watched	a	spirit	medium	exorcise	a	monkey	demon,	heard	a	Christian	preacher	relate	her	battles	with	ghosts,	and	received	social	media	messages	implying	that	passengers	in	an	evil	cult	were	responsible	for	the	lost	Malaysia	Airlines	plane.		This	essay	explores	these	three	contrasting	stories	of	good	and	evil	in	contemporary	China	to	show	how	they	foster	multiple	moralities.		We	will	argue	that	the	key	differences	among	these	concurrent	moralities	arise	from	the	fundamentally	different	kinds	of	boundaries	they	draw	between	good	and	evil,	rather	than	simply	from	a	choice	among	varying	goods	and	evils.	Some	boundaries	are	permeable	and	mediated;	others	draw	clear	lines	of	differentiation.		Still	other	systems	seek	only	to	dissolve	boundaries,	leaving	no	room	for	any	alternative.		Reconsidering	the	boundaries	between	good	and	evil	in	this	way	can	help	us	think	about	ways	to	deal	with	people	who	are	truly	different	from	us,	that	is,	about	problems	of	empathy	and	pluralism.	We	often	think	of	boundaries	as	clear	lines	of	separation.		The	political	boundaries	of	nation-states	are	intended	to	work	this	way,	as	are	the	boundaries	created	by	legal	codes.		Mary	Douglas's	(1966)	famous	discussion	of	the	prohibitions	of	Leviticus,	for	example,	argued	that	kosher	laws	condemned	areas	of	ambiguity	between	categories	as	unclean,	and	thus	clarified	and	solidified	boundaries.		Nevertheless,	other	ways	of	thinking	about	boundaries	can	be	just	as	important.	Seligman	and	Weller	thus	explore	how	humans	“create	boundaries	and	transcend	them	at	the	same	time”	(2012:	5)	and	argue	that	while	categories	are	important	
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means	through	which	we	understand	the	world,	ambiguities	allow	us	to	live	together	despite	differences	created	by	boundaries.			Rituals,	for	example,	always	cross	and	re-cross	boundaries,	most	obviously	between	the	sacred	and	profane,	and	between	ritual	time	and	ordinary	time.		They	work	more	like	cell	walls	than	brick	walls,	allowing	and	encouraging	movement	across	the	boundaries	that	they	define.		This	ability	to	cross	over	the	separations	of	self,	ethnicity	or	nation	is	a	key	reason	why	some	early	Confucian	texts	emphasized	the	critical	role	of	ritual	in	creating	social	order.2		Still	other	kinds	of	boundaries	can	instead	be	fuzzy	and	open,	leaving	wide	space	for	ambiguity	or	contextual	renegotiation.		Such	alternate	understandings	of	boundaries	are	especially	important	for	thinking	about	the	relation	between	self	and	other	because	they	deal	differently	with	issues	of	ambiguity	and	difference	(Seligman	and	Weller	2012).		Each	of	the	three	cases	we	discuss	here	imagines	the	boundaries	between	good	and	evil	(and	thus	in	a	sense	between	self	and	other)	very	differently.3		That	is	why	we	see	them	as	fundamentally	alternative	moral	worlds,	even	if	their	various	concepts	of	good	and	evil	overlap.	Two	of	our	cases	tie	intimately	to	contemporary	life	in	the	booming	cities	of	southern	Jiangsu	Province,	one	of	China's	most	developed	regions;	the	third	is	
																																																								2	For	an	example	from	the	Book	of	Rites,	see	Puett	(2010).	3	We	are	using	the	word	"evil"	here	mostly	as	a	loose	and	broad	translation	of	the	Chinese	term	xie	(
邪),	because	that	is	the	term	we	heard	most	often	from	our	informants.		Usually	translated	as	"evil"	or	"heterodox,"	literal	readings	of	xie	include	"crooked"	and	"irregular."		It	is	the	opposite	of	zheng	(正),	meaning	upright	or	orthodox.		There	are	many	other	plausible	candidates	for	"evil"	in	Chinese	as	well,	including	bushan	(不善,	non-good),	zui'e	(罪恶,	crimes	and	loathsomeness,	Christian	"sin"),	yinci	(淫祠,	immoral	temples),	and	others.	
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national	although	we	will	focus	to	some	extent	on	its	implementation	in	Jiangsu.4		The	first	case	was	a	battle	waged	between	a	spirit	medium	possessed	by	Sakyamuni	Buddha	and	a	monkey	demon	(猴子精)	who	had	infiltrated	a	woman's	body.		The	spirit	medium’s	power,	as	we	will	discuss,	though	attributed	to	the	Buddha,	comes	from	his	ability	to	negotiate	between	good	and	evil	and	to	harness	the	power	of	the	evil.		The	boundaries	here	are	ambiguous	and	easily	crossed.		The	second	case	is	the	story	of	how	a	preacher	joined	the	True	Jesus	Church,	a	loosely	Pentecostal	movement	she	helped	bring	back	to	life	in	one	large	city	in	the	1990s.		The	process	for	her	was	an	exhausting	battle	against	ghosts	and	demons	(鬼),	and	similar	battles	continue	to	be	an	important	part	of	the	discourse	of	this	group.		Here	the	boundary	between	good	and	evil	is	not	permeable,	but	must	be	clearly	defined	in	order	to	consolidate	group	identity.		Finally	we	will	discuss	condemnations	of	"evil	cults"	(邪
教),	which	have	taken	place	nationally.		These	condemnations	occur	within	a	larger	discourse	of	universal,	unbounded	goodness	and	love	that	these	groups	promote;	it	has	strong	affinities	with	post-Enlightenment	ideas	of	universal	values	in	a	world	of	progress.		This	talk	of	generalized	love	never	mentions	evil	and	leaves	no	apparent	space	for	a	boundary	around	goodness,	but	evil	nevertheless	remains	out	there	and	must	be	destroyed	to	maintain	the	imagined	boundlessness	of	good.		We	will	turn	in	this	final	case	briefly	to	Freud,	who	discussed	(in	a	rather	different	context)	how																																																									4	Because	of	privacy	concerns,	we	will	be	vague	about	exact	locations	and	will	generally	not	use	real	names.		The	primary	field	sites	include	Nanjing,	Suzhou,	Changzhou,	and	Changshu,	all	of	which	have	populations	of	at	least	one	million.		All	of	the	cases	and	interviews	we	discuss	in	detail	here	occurred	in	2013-2014,	when	Weller	spent	a	year	doing	fieldwork	in	the	region	and	Wu	spent	several	months.	Wu's	field	research	in	the	region	extends	back	to	2006.		Most	of	this	work	focused	on	religion	and	philanthropy,	especially	in	Buddhism	and	Christianity.		These	incidents	of	evil	were	an	unforeseen	benefit	of	that	fieldwork.	
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ideals	of	universal	love	can	also	drive	extreme	versions	of	intolerance	–	boundaries	(and	the	people	on	the	other	side	of	them)	that	should	be	annihilated	rather	than	clarified	or	crossed.			Talking	about	multiple	sets	of	good/evil	with	different	kinds	of	relationships	between	them	reminds	us	that	we	need	to	be	careful	not	to	read	the	particular	Western	theological	history	of	Evil	into	every	context.		There	are	lots	of	different	evils,	each	reshaped	by	the	good	with	which	it	interacts	and	by	the	nature	of	the	boundary	around	it.		Alternative	conceptions	of	the	relation	between	good	and	evil	thus	create	different	moralities.	By	emphasizing	the	symbiosis	and	multiplicity	of	good	and	evil,	we	aim	to	bypass	what	some	have	called	the	“Durkheimian	trap”	in	current	discussions	on	the	anthropology	of	morality	–	the	argument	about	whether	morality	means	routinely	following	a	set	of	social	norms	or	instead	means	that	individuals	must	consciously	choose	among	conflicting	values	(Yan	2011b).		Yunxiang	Yan,	for	example,	describes	contemporary	China	as	a	place	with	multiple	ethical	discourses	and	moral	practices	that	coexist	in	tension	and	contradiction.		Even	though	he	sees	a	general	shift	toward	an	individualistic	ethics	of	rights	and	self-development,	he	argues	that	the	older	forms	still	operate	as	deep	currents	(Yan	2011a,	70).	Similarly,	the	three	versions	of	good	and	evil	we	discuss	are	present	concomitantly,	creating	a	dynamic	field.		We	hope	to	make	a	stronger	point,	however,	that	the	nature	of	the	boundaries	drawn	between	them	may	be	more	significant	than	the	content	of	the	various	ethical	traditions.		A	focus	on	the	boundary	itself	helps	clarify	how	morality	depends	on	more	than	just	the	choices	we	
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make:		it	depends	on	how	we	conceptualize	the	relationship	between	good	and	evil	rather	than	just	the	specific	content	of	the	categories.		In	taking	this	approach,	we	are	drawing	on	recent	literature	in	the	anthropology	of	morality	that	leaves	space	for	multiple	moralities,	but	our	emphasis	on	the	nature	of	the	boundaries	is	quite	different	from	that	literature's	focus	on	freedom	and	agency	(Laidlaw	2014)	and	on	the	“morality	of	choice”	in	times	of	cultural	change	(Robbins	2007).	It	is	not	possible	in	this	article	to	discuss	the	modern	history	of	ethical	change	in	China;	the	situation	is	so	complex	as	to	defy	easy	summary.		It	is	tempting	to	suggest	a	sort	of	evolution	from	the	sort	of	relational	morality	which	Fei	Xiaotong	(1992)	suggested	was	traditionally	Chinese,	to	the	class-based	love	(and	hate)	of	the	Maoist	period,	to	a	more	universalizing	discourse	of	individual-based	ethics	today.		Such	a	story	indeed	captures	part	of	the	picture	in	China	today,	and	we	will	expand	on	it	in	the	section	about	love	below.		Yet	it	greatly	underestimates	the	complexity	of	ethical	thought	both	now	and	historically	in	China.		Older	moralities	continued	through	the	Maoist	period	(see	Yan	2011a),	but	they	also	constantly	adapted.		Thus	all	three	versions	of	goodness	and	evil	that	we	discuss	are	fully	modern	in	the	sense	that	they	continue	to	make	sense	of	contemporary	experience	for	people.		Nevertheless,	as	we	will	discuss	below,	our	focus	on	the	nature	of	the	boundary	suggests	that	the	one	with	the	least	space	for	tolerance	and	empathy	may	be	the	most	universalizing	version	of	goodness,	which	has	tended	to	dominate	the	discourse	of	"modern"	morality	and	philanthropy	in	China	and	elsewhere.	
Buddha	Battles	a	Monkey	Demon	
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Chen	is	an	"incense	leader"	(xiangtou	香头)	with	a	large	network	of	followers	and	an	imposing	reputation	that	includes	rumors	of	ties	to	both	the	police	and	less	savory	social	elements.		The	term	"incense	leader"	in	this	region	refers	to	people	who	can	take	one	or	more	of	three	different	roles:		they	mediate	relations	between	clients	and	religious	specialists	by	arranging	major	household	rituals	like	funerals,	they	arrange	pilgrimages	to	important	temples,	and	they	act	as	spirit	mediums.		Chen	performs	all	three	roles,	and	is	thus	a	mediator	between	different	kinds	of	religious	actors,	between	temples,	and	between	humans	and	the	spirit	world.	He	lives	in	a	large,	elaborate	mansion	at	the	expanding	edge	of	the	city	–	an	area	that	was	mostly	agricultural	a	decade	earlier.		From	the	outside	there	are	no	obvious	religious	markers	except	a	large	pile	of	ash	from	the	recent	burning	of	spirit	money.		His	main	shrine	is	in	a	steel-sided	building	to	the	right	of	the	house;	with	the	doors	closed	it	appears	to	be	a	garage.	Inside,	however,	the	shrine	centers	on	an	altar	to	Sakyamuni	and	has	the	usual	paraphernalia	of	a	temple.		On	a	bright	spring	morning	in	2014,	he	sat	in	the	large	leather	chair	behind	the	desk	to	the	right	of	the	altar,	while	one	of	us	chatted	with	him	and	various	clients	who	wandered	in.5		Chen's	story	is	not	unusual	for	a	spirit	medium.		He	was	plagued	with	illness	from	when	he	was	about	8	years	old	until	Sakyamuni	and	Guanyin	began	speaking	to	him	when	he	was	16.		Those	gods,	he	explained,	look	nothing	like	what	we	would	expect	from	the	usual	paintings	and	statues.		Sakyamuni	in	particular	bears	little	resemblance	to	the	calm	and	kindly																																																									5	We	are	grateful	to	the	anthropologist	Yang	Der-Ruey	for	introducing	us	to	Chen.		He	was	also	present	on	this	occasion.		Weller	also	spent	time	with	Chen	and	several	of	his	disciples	after	this,	and	again	during	a	visit	in	2015.		Both	authors	have	also	spent	much	longer	periods	of	time	with	other	incense	leaders	in	the	region.	
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images	we	usually	see.		He	is	actually	enormous	and	very	dark,	with	bare	feet.		Most	striking	is	a	band	of	blackness	all	around	his	eyes,	which	Chen	kept	emphasizing.		This	is	a	Buddha	to	inspire	awe	in	Rudolf	Otto's	sense:		fear	as	much	as	love,	dread	as	much	as	respect	(Otto	1958).		Such	power	is	what	lets	Chen	do	battle	with	demonic	spirits.	As	we	were	talking,	a	tall,	gaunt	woman	walked	in	without	a	word	and	began	worshipping	in	front	of	the	altar.		Chen	quickly	shooed	her	out	to	stand	alone	in	the	courtyard	in	front	of	the	building	while	he	continued	our	conversation.		At	one	point	he	said,	"You	know,	there	are	really	a	lot	of	evil	things	(xie	dongxi	邪东西)	in	the	world	right	now.		It	hasn't	been	this	bad	for	maybe	twelve	or	thirteen	years."		When	asked	what	he	meant	by	"evil	things"	he	frowned	and	silently	pointed	at	the	woman	standing	outside.		Like	many	of	his	clients,	she	had	no	social	ties	to	Chen	before	she	got	sick.		She	had	just	heard	of	his	reputation	and	came	to	see	him.		He	thus	treated	her	without	knowing	much	about	her	life.	Cured	clients	sometimes	establish	stronger	ties	with	Chen	and	now	form	a	network	of	several	dozen	people.		Some	of	them	become	his	formal	disciples.		This	woman,	however,	had	not	maintained	the	tie	and	so	was	not	well	known	to	Chen	or	to	the	various	members	of	his	network	who	were	lounging	in	the	temple	at	this	point.		There	was	also	no	extended	verbal	interaction	with	her	before	or	during	the	session.	Chen	kept	interrupting	our	conversation	to	talk	on	his	cell	phone.		During	one	of	these	calls	his	body	seemed	to	undergo	a	subtle	change,	and	one	of	his	hands	clenched	into	a	fist,	gently	shaking	in	the	air.		He	beckoned	the	woman	back	in	and	gestured	that	she	should	worship	again	at	the	altar.		As	she	did	this	Chen	continued	
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to	sit	in	his	chair,	slouched	down	in	a	mild	trance.		His	hands	formed	various	esoteric	mudras,	not	quickly,	but	with	a	calm	patience.		Occasionally	he	flicked	his	thumb	against	one	of	his	finger	joints,	just	as	Daoist	priests	do	to	invoke	various	divine	generals	that	they	control.		At	several	points	his	lips	moved	as	he	uttered	a	silent	mantra.		As	this	went	on,	the	woman	began	to	emit	occasional	odd	belches.		And	then	she	wept.		Sometimes	she	did	both	at	once	as	the	episodes	of	crying	and	belching	waxed	and	waned.	After	a	while	he	stood	up	from	his	chair	and	walked	over	to	her.		With	his	hand	formed	into	a	sword	mudra,	he	pressed	his	fingers	onto	her	forehead	between	her	eyes.		He	then	touched	the	sword-hand	to	the	very	top	of	her	head.		Her	sobbing	grew	louder	as	he	drew	magical	talismans	(fu	符)	in	the	air	in	front	of	her.		When	he	placed	his	whole	hand	down	on	the	top	of	her	head,	her	entire	body	began	to	shake	and	quiver.		He	pressed	the	attack	further,	now	with	fingers	at	both	her	temples.		With	this,	she	spoke	for	the	first	time.		Or	perhaps	not	she	but	"it,"	the	evil	thing	that	had	hold	of	her.		It	yelled	in	a	hoarse	voice	full	of	anger:		"I	am	only	a	little	weaker	than	you!		I	will	be	back	to	fight	you	again!"		This	was	one	of	the	only	verbalized	moments	in	the	session.	The	battle	gradually	calmed	down	and	Chen	then	escorted	the	woman	–	now	no	longer	crying	or	belching	–	to	a	smaller	altar	inside	his	house	to	recite	a	simple	Buddhist	text	on	her	own.		He	soon	rejoined	us	and	explained	that	she	was	possessed	by	an	extremely	powerful	monkey	demon	(猴子精).		"It	could	speak	human	language,"	he	said.		"Do	you	have	any	idea	how	long	they	have	to	cultivate	themselves	to	master	that?		At	least	3,000	years!"	
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Monkey	demons	and	similar	animal	spirits	are	a	staple	for	mediums	like	Chen,	who	can	be	found	throughout	the	region.		Fox	spirits	(狐狸精)	are	the	best	known,	but	Chen	has	cured	even	very	unusual	ones	like	a	fish	and	a	toad	demon	(see	Kang	2005).		Such	mediums	use	their	power	to	subdue	and	expel	the	evil	thing	possessing	the	victim.		Control	of	such	great	power,	of	course,	is	itself	dangerous,	and	the	line	between	evil	and	good	can	sometimes	blur	–	recall	the	gargantuan	scale	and	darkly	shaded	eyes	of	Chen's	Sakyamuni.	Similar	to	shamans	in	Siberia	and	witchcraft	in	Cameroon,	sometimes	"evil	things"	in	China	are	not	simply	exorcised,	but	can	be	tamed	or	“canalized	and	used	for	constructive	aims	in	order	to	make	society	work”	(Geschiere	1997,	291).		The	spiritual	entourages	who	surround	major	deities	in	China	often	look	frightening,	with	bulging	eyes	and	grimacing	faces	in	unnatural	colors.		This	is	because	their	origins	are	in	fact	demonic.		They	serve	these	gods	only	because	the	gods	have	overpowered	them	and	rechanneled	them	for	better	purposes.		Many	deities	themselves	have	hints	of	evil	mixed	into	their	origin	stories	(Shahar	and	Weller	1996).	In	this	context,	none	is	better	known	than	Sun	Wukong	(孙悟空),	who	was	made	famous	throughout	China	in	the	popular	Ming	Dynasty	novel	Journey	to	the	
West.		He	is	best	known	in	English	through	the	translation	of	his	name	simply	as	Monkey.		Born	from	a	stone,	he	is	a	nature	spirit	whose	origins	are	very	similar	to	the	spirit	that	Chen	fought.		Sun	Wukong	gradually	cultivated	his	powers	until	he	became	more	powerful	than	all	the	forces	of	the	gods.		In	the	novel,	the	monkey	is	a	magical	trickster	who	wreaks	utter	havoc	in	heaven	until	the	Jade	Emperor	has	to	
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ask	Sakyamuni	to	intervene.		Ultimately	controlled	by	the	Buddha,	Sun	Wukong	eventually	helps	bring	Buddhist	sutras	to	China	–	the	trickster	ultimately	comes	to	serve	the	dharma.	This	character	had	complex	origins,	but	is	in	part	a	novelistic	translation	of	the	animal	spirits	that	occur	across	China.6		Like	Sun	Wukong,	the	evil	monkey	spirit	battling	Chen	began	by	cultivating	himself	alone	in	the	mountains.		Demons	like	this	one	increase	their	powers	by	devouring	the	fundamental	life	energy	(元气)	of	their	victims.		As	Chen	explained,	if	left	untreated,	these	victims	invariably	die	a	wasting	death.		Usually	such	demons	(unlike	Sun	Wukong),	if	they	do	not	kill	their	hosts,	flee	back	to	the	mountains	after	being	exorcised,	cultivating	themselves	ever	further.		This	is	exactly	what	our	monkey	demon	will	do.		Because	he	had	not	fully	defeated	the	demon	while	we	were	there,	Chen	undertook	a	more	complicated	and	dangerous	ritual	later	(too	dangerous	for	us	to	witness).		This,	he	reported,	was	fully	successful.		The	woman	was	cured,	but	the	monkey,	he	felt	sure,	would	eventually	be	back.	Mediums	like	Chen	move	across	the	edges	of	the	worlds	of	awe-inspiring	gods,	murderous	animal	spirits,	and	human	society.		These	worlds	intertwine	to	the	extent	that	it	can	sometimes	be	difficult	to	extricate	one	from	the	other.		For	incense	leaders,	the	boundary	between	good	and	evil	is	permeable;	mediums	like	Chen	have	to	be	able	to	cross	it,	and	it	is	possible	for	spirits	and	people	to	move	largely	from	one	side	to	the	other.		For	example,	part	of	Chen's	responsibility	as	a	spiritual	mediator	is	to	arrange	pilgrimages	for	his	followers.		Every	year	he	makes	sure	to	include	at	least	one	trip	to	Shangfang	Mountain	(上方山),	which	is	also	in	southern																																																									6	For	one	line	of	origin,	and	some	discussion	of	others,	see	Shahar	(1992).	
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Jiangsu.		This	site	is	especially	famous	for	its	temple	to	Taimu	(太母),	the	Great	Mother.		She	was	said	to	be	the	mother	of	the	Wutong	(五通)	deities,	who	have	long	been	among	the	most	important	gods	throughout	this	region.		Yet	the	Wutong	themselves	have	a	past	that	was	clearly	demonic,	and	the	entire	cult	was	often	attacked	by	Confucian	scholars	and	officials	as	something	evil.7		According	to	Chen,	Taimu	herself	is	a	spider	demon,	by	far	the	most	powerful	such	spirit	in	the	entire	region.		Not	everyone	understands	her	as	a	spider,	but	another	one	of	her	spirit	mediums	elsewhere	in	the	region	completely	agreed,	saying	that	she	feels	spiders	crawling	up	and	down	her	body	when	Taimu	possesses	her.		Why	take	people	on	pilgrimages	there?		Chen	explains	that	it	is	because	Shangfang	Mountain	is	the	origin	for	most	of	the	"evil	things"	who	attack	the	people	he	treats.		Going	to	her	is	like	going	straight	to	the	biggest	gangster	of	all	in	order	to	get	the	petty	hoodlums	to	back	off.	Shangfang	Mountain	is	also	the	center	for	the	practice	of	"taking	out	dark	loans"	(借阴债).		These	are	enormous	favors	that	one	can	ask	from	Taimu's	children,	the	Wutong	(see	von	Glahn	2004,	229–232).		Unlike	the	practice	at	most	temples,	where	gods	will	grant	only	morally	upright	requests,	these	dark	loans	can	be	for	anything	at	all,	regardless	of	morality.		Such	loans	are	more	like	the	ones	available	from	gangsters	than	from	friends,	however	–	the	interest	rate	is	high	and	the	punishment	for	failing	to	repay	is	dire.		In	many	cases,	the	repayment	is	said	to	come	at	the	expense	of	the	borrower's	children,	whose	health	and	fate	are	mortally	
																																																								7	There	is	a	significant	scholarly	literature	on	the	Wutong.		In	English,	see	(Guo	2003),	Szonyi(1997),	and	von	Glahn	(2004).	
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damaged	as	a	result.8		These	stories	long	predate	the	modern	period,	and	it	should	not	surprise	us	that	this	talk	of	the	amorality	of	loans,	money,	and	markets	in	general	thrived	in	this	area	that	had	long	been	the	commercial	heartland	of	China.9	These	stories	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	simple	critique	of	the	market,	however.		The	"evil	things"	that	underlie	them	arise	from	stories	about	selfish	individualism	rather	than	directly	about	markets	and	commodities.		The	monkey	demon,	for	example,	gained	its	power	through	intensive	self-cultivation	(修行).		Cultivation	in	China	is	generally	very	highly	valued	as	a	way	of	becoming	a	better	person,	whether	pursued	through	meditation,	practicing	calligraphy,	or	studying	the	Confucian	classics.		Animal	spirits	like	our	monkey	are	pursuing	a	very	similar	route,	but	rather	than	using	it	to	make	themselves	better	members	of	a	structured	social	community,	they	are	sacrificing	the	community	to	fortify	their	own	individual	power.		The	problem	is	not	cultivation	itself,	but	rather	the	destruction	of	social	networks	and	the	abrupt	ending	of	patrilines	(just	as	in	taking	out	dark	loans)	for	the	sake	of	the	isolated	individual.		Those	who	benefit	monetarily	at	the	expense	of	their	offspring’s	fortune	by	worshipping	the	Wutong	are	extremely	selfish	individuals	who	destroy	the	lineage	and	the	community.		On	the	other	hand,	incense	leaders	like	Chen	are	nodes	in	the	local	social	community,	both	holding	together	and	actively	creating	those	networks.	How	does	one	balance	the	demands	of	these	social	networks	against	the	need	to	pursue	one's	own	interests?		This	is	never	an	easy	issue,	and	a	thriving	market																																																									8	Such	stories	are	remarkably	similar	to	the	Eighteen	Lords	temple	in	1980s	Taiwan,	which	one	of	us	has	documented	elsewhere	(Weller	1994).	9	See,	for	example,	Kuhn	(1992).	
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economy	with	its	opportunities	for	profit	makes	it	even	more	difficult.		On	the	one	hand,	we	have	Macfarlane's	suggestion	that	a	money	economy	is	"fatally	entwined	with	an	inability	to	distinguish	good	and	evil,"	because	the	market	creates	an	amoral	world	in	which	such	judgments	are	impossible	(Macfarlane	1985,	74).		On	the	other,	there	is	Taussig's	well-known	argument	about	Colombian	devil	worship	rumors,	which	sees	rather	similar	stories	of	evil	as	critiques	of	capitalism	from	the	viewpoint	of	a	prior	mode	of	production	(Taussig	1980).	Neither	of	these	classic	arguments	works	very	smoothly	for	this	case,	however.		Unlike	Macfarlane's	claim,	an	interaction	between	good	and	evil	remains	vibrant.		Unlike	Taussig's	argument,	we	have	seen	a	similar	dynamic	of	good/evil	at	play	in	this	region	of	China	for	centuries.		In	this	area	of	China,	urbanization	and	relocation	have	been	taking	place	over	long	periods,	and	a	commercial	economy	was	already	strongly	developed	by	the	sixteenth	century.		We	do	not	have	a	battle	between	older	and	newer	modes	of	production.		We	do,	however,	witness	a	tension	that	has	remained	permanently	unresolved	and	continues	to	make	sense	of	experience	even	in	the	rapidly	changing	conditions	of	today.		It	tells	us	that	power	is	always	two-edged,	that	finding	a	path	in	the	world	requires	negotiating	good	and	evil,	and	that	the	potential	for	evil	always	lurks,	not	just	over	our	shoulders	but	in	our	own	desires.		Just	as	importantly,	this	kind	of	permeable	boundary	requires	people	to	live	with	interactions	between	good	and	evil,	between	one's	own	people	and	those	powers	that	are	fundamentally	different	and	sometimes	opposed	to	us.		That	is,	it	requires	people	to	relate	pluralistically,	always	open	to	movement	across	
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the	boundary,	so	that	a	stone	monkey	spirit	can	become	a	protector	of	the	dharma,	and	a	spirit	medium	healer	can	make	offerings	to	the	mother	of	evil.	
Ghosts	and	the	Holy	Spirit	Preacher	Liu	became	a	Christian	in	the	early	1980s.10		A	decade	later	she	was	running	a	Presbyterian	house	church	with	about	thirty	or	forty	followers.		By	the	early	1990s,	however,	she	began	to	feel	some	dissatisfaction.		As	a	result	she	joined	a	group	of	about	a	dozen	seminary	students	on	a	trip	to	visit	a	preacher	they	had	heard	about	in	Fujian.		As	it	turned	out,	he	was	a	leader	of	the	True	Jesus	Church	(真
耶稣教),	a	form	of	indigenous	charismatic	Christianity	that	began	in	north	China	in	1917	as	part	of	the	rapid	global	spread	of	the	Pentecostal	movement	at	the	time.11		Not	willing	to	join	the	officially	sanctioned	Three	Self	Church	after	the	Communist	revolution,	it	had	not	survived	even	underground	in	her	home	city.		Liu	herself	knew	nothing	about	the	church	at	the	time,	but	shared	in	the	general	unhappiness	of	some	Christians	in	the	early	1990s	with	an	official	church	that	had	been	very	slow	to	change	with	the	times.		Note	that	this	was,	in	her	mind,	completely	an	act	of	religious	searching	with	no	political	implications.		True	Jesus	is	not	much	liked	by	the	official	Protestant	church	in	China,	but	it	has	been	tolerated	in	Liu's	city	since	it	reopened.		It	is	registered	with	the	Religious	Affairs	Bureau	and	operates	legally	and	openly.	
																																																								10	Both	authors	visited	her	church	separately	on	numerous	occasions	in	2014.		We	interviewed	other	members	of	the	staff	and	took	part	in	multiple	services.		Most	of	the	quotes	here	come	from	a	single	long	interview,	but	the	broader	analysis	draws	on	the	other	visits	as	well.	11	On	the	history	of	the	True	Jesus	Church,	see	Inouye	(2011)	and	Lian	(2010).	
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The	group	arrived	in	Fujian	and	the	True	Jesus	preacher	there	explained	the	Bible	in	ways	she	had	never	heard	before.		The	Presbyterians,	she	said,	had	always	condemned	True	Jesus	as	an	evil	cult	(邪教),	so	she	had	never	before	paid	attention	to	them.		She	went	to	bed	that	night	feeling	that	perhaps	finally	she	was	beginning	to	see	what	was	True,	perhaps	she	had	found	her	true	home.	And	that	is	when	the	ghosts	(鬼)	attacked.		Male	and	female	ghosts,	ghosts	of	the	night	and	of	the	day,	monstrous	and	mischievous	ghosts,	she	battled	them	day	after	day.		The	first	came	at	2:15	in	the	morning,	with	the	sort	of	music,	she	explained,	that	people	hear	in	traditional	Chinese	ghost	stories,	right	before	the	fox	spirit	shows	up.12		As	she	told	it:	I	wanted	to	sleep,	but	as	soon	as	I	heard	that	music	I	didn't	dare…	The	door	opened…	and	what	sort	of	thing	came	in?		It	was	like	a	man,	but	so	tall	[gesturing	very	high	with	her	hand],	with	a	human	head	and	an	animal	face!		And	his	whole	body	was	covered	in	fur…	Then	I	got	up	to	my	knees.		I	was	kneeling	and	he	was	standing,	we	were	eye-to-eye…	Then	with	my	hands	I	started	to	pray,	you	know	"In	Jesus'	name	bind	up	this	devil,"	that	kind	of	thing.		Those	outside	religions	(外教),	the	Presbyterians,	that	kind	of	prayer.		And	I	jabbed	at	his	nose.		His	eyes	were	really	big,	and	he	hated	me,	and	I	hated	him.		He	wanted	to	devour	me	and	I	wanted	to	devour	him,	that's	how	it	felt…	And	then	he	left.																																																									12	She	referred	explicitly	to	the	most	famous	collection	of	ghost	stories	in	China,	translated	as	Strange	
Stories	from	a	Chinese	Studio	(聊斋志异),	written	in	the	early	Qing	Dynasty	by	Pu	Songling.		Liu	almost	always	used	the	traditional	term	for	ghost	rather	than	more	usual	Christian	terminology.	
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Although	this	first	ghost	left,	other	ghosts	constantly	hounded	her,	day	and	night.		Still,	she	did	not	admit	the	problem	to	the	others.		"I	wasn't	embarrassed	exactly,	but	I	thought	that	since	I	have	been	a	Christian	for	so	long,	how	can	I	be	telling	people	about	seeing	ghosts?		They	would	think	there	was	something	wrong	with	my	faith.		How	can	you	see	ghosts	after	being	a	Christian	for	more	than	a	decade?"	She	went	on	to	explain	how	the	True	Jesus	people	at	this	church	prayed	by	speaking	in	tongues	(灵言)	every	evening.		She	admired	their	explanations	of	it,	but	she	could	not	do	it.		She	had	always	prayed	consciously	(悟性祷告)	and	silently	as	a	Presbyterian,	but	this	was	like	a	"torrential	flood	crashing	out	of	the	mountains,	it	just	completely	knocked	you	over."		She	could	not	manage	this	kind	of	prayer	at	all.		Often	she	did	not	dare	to	join	the	prayer	group.		Once	when	she	did,	she	felt	her	hand	starting	to	shake	as	the	Holy	Spirit	moved	her,	but	it	frightened	her	and	she	grasped	it	with	the	other	hand	until	the	shaking	stopped.		Meanwhile,	ghosts	continued	to	assail	her.		Finally,	after	three	days	and	nights	of	this,	she	could	no	longer	bear	the	constant	struggle	and	lack	of	sleep:	I	said	I	have	to	go	home,	and	they	asked	why…	I	explained	that	I	had	already	been	battling	the	ghosts	for	days,	I	wanted	to	go;	if	I	didn't	go	I	wasn't	sure	I	could	continue	living.		Then	they	led	me	in	prayer.		There,	on	the	third	day	at	the	same	time,	God	ordered	the	Devil	very	clearly	to	let	me	go.		I	heard	the	ghost	music	again,	and	I	said,	"Oh	heavens,	it's	back	again,	in	the	daylight!"		It	was	the	same	ghost	from	three	days	before…		At	that	time	I	had	hated	him	so	much,	and	I	
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thought	"I	already	defeated	you	once,	I	took	a	big	bite	out	of	you!"		But	whatever,	I	was	going	all	out	to	fight	him	again…		He	hated	me	and	wanted	my	death;	I	hated	him	and	wanted	his	death.		I	jabbed	at	his	nose,	over	and	over…	but	I	couldn't	hit	him.		Then	he	looked	at	me,	oh,	maybe	for	a	minute,	and	then	his	–	it	wasn't	really	a	hand	but	a	claw	–	clutched	at	my	head.		He	pulled	off	a	fishnet.		He	pulled	it	right	off	my	head	and	left.		He	had	spread	it	over	my	head,	three	days	earlier	he	had	put	it	there,	and	now	three	days	later	he	took	it	away.		He	was	gone…		I	fainted.	While	unconscious	she	felt	herself	falling	deep	down,	crying	out	to	the	Lord	that	she	had	been	wrong,	that	she	wanted	to	be	baptized	in	the	True	Jesus	Church	(which	does	full	immersion	adult	baptism	and	does	not	recognize	the	baptism	of	other	churches);	she	did	not	want	to	die	but	wanted	another	chance.		When	she	came	to,	the	local	preacher	told	her	how	to	invite	the	Holy	Spirit	in.		She	went	upstairs	to	pray,	explaining	to	the	Lord	that	if	he	did	not	allow	the	Holy	Spirit	to	come	down	she	would	have	to	fight	the	ghosts	again,	and	she	would	surely	die.		She	then	knelt	down	to	pray	in	the	True	Jesus	fashion,	confessing	her	sins	to	God	and	saying	"Hallelujah!"		On	the	fourth	hallelujah,	she	suddenly	heard	herself	speaking	an	unknown	language.	It	sounded	like	Cantonese	or	some	sort	of	weird	dialect.		It	sounded	so	odd.		Who	was	talking?		It	sounded	like	birds	tweeting,	bird	language	[a	common	way	in	China	to	make	fun	of	southern	dialects],	that's	how	I	felt.		I	didn't	understand	about	receiving	the	Holy	Spirit.		
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It	scared	me	to	death…	I	didn't	dare	open	my	eyes…		I	didn't	know	I	had	received	the	Holy	Spirit.		I	thought,	this	is	horrible,	have	I	turned	into	a	bird?		These	sounds	were	really	coming	from	me.		Oh	no,	I	must	really	be	a	bird	and	I	could	never	go	home	again.		I	kept	my	eyes	tightly	closed,	because	I	was	afraid	that	if	I	opened	them	I	would	see	I	really	was	a	bird…		Finally,	with	my	eyes	closed,	I	felt	my	head.		Was	it	really	a	human	head	or	a	bird	head?		And	it	didn't	feel	like	my	head!		This	was	the	Holy	Spirit	rebuking	me.		What	bird	language?!		You	have	received	the	Holy	Spirit!		You	have	sinned	so	much,	I	love	you	so	much,	the	Holy	Spirit	came	to	rebuke	me.	The	ghosts	never	returned.		Liu	was	baptized	into	the	True	Jesus	Church,	and	returned	home	to	tell	her	Presbyterian	congregation	that	hers	would	now	be	a	True	Jesus	church.		Most	of	them	stayed	with	her,	and	the	group	reports	that	they	have	baptized	about	1,800	people	in	this	city	in	the	two	decades	since	then.	Evil	here	is	necessary,	although	in	quite	a	different	way	from	the	world	of	the	spirit	medium	and	the	monkey	demon.		Both	evils	are	life	threatening;	both	even	look	alike	to	some	extent,	part	human	and	part	animal.		Yet,	the	kinds	of	boundaries	they	draw	work	in	very	different	ways.		Chen's	evil	and	good	can	morph	into	each	other,	as	we	see	in	his	worship	of	Taimu,	the	mother	of	evil,	and	perhaps	even	in	the	frightening	visage	of	his	Sakyamuni	Buddha.		It	is	never	ultimately	defeated,	but	rather	compromised	with.		In	a	way,	Chen's	power	of	the	good	grows	as	the	power	of	evil	gets	stronger.		The	border	between	them	is	permanently	ambiguous	and	fuzzy.		If	the	evil	completely	disappeared,	the	existence	of	good	would	become	
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unnecessary.		An	absolute	boundary,	however,	marks	off	Liu's	evil,	and	drives	one	to	the	absolute	good	of	God.	Liu's	True	Jesus	experience	was	very	much	about	creating	integration,	for	her	self	as	an	individual	psyche	and	for	the	church	more	broadly.		Evil	always	pushes	on	them	from	the	outside,	threatening	dissolution	of	integrity.		We	can	see	it	clearly	in	Liu's	own	personal	sense	of	integration,	which	almost	collapsed	completely	during	her	ordeal.		Recall	her	joking	reference	to	"bird	language,"	which	quickly	became	no	joke	at	all	as	she	reached	to	touch	her	head,	sure	that	she	herself	was	no	longer	human.		And	recall	the	rapidly	shifting	point	of	view	at	this	crisis	point:		"You	have	sinned	so	much,	I	love	you	so	much,	the	Holy	Spirit	came	to	rebuke	me."		She	reintegrates	only	by	finally	recognizing	and	accepting	the	gift	of	the	Holy	Spirit.		In	the	same	way,	the	church	itself	maintains	integrity	by	fighting	the	evil	that	is	always	trying	to	pull	its	followers	away	from	the	Truth.	For	instance,	Liu	told	us	that	they	have	special	services	for	people	who	are	unable	to	speak	in	tongues.		The	Spirit	descends,	she	said,	only	to	people	without	sin.		Those	who	cannot	speak	in	tongues	(including,	of	course,	most	other	kinds	of	Christians)	are	thus	sinners,	seduced	by	evil.		On	another	occasion,	an	older	woman	came	to	ask	Liu	why	she	kept	hearing	strange	whispers	and	noises,	like	windows	rattling.		"Don't	worry,"	said	Liu,	"it's	just	devils	(魔鬼)…		Ignore	them…	Don't	be	afraid	of	them	and	keep	reading	the	Bible	and	praying	to	God."		When	she	preached	later	that	day,	the	message	was	similar,	but	much	more	dire.		She	spoke	of	things	that	Christians	should	avoid,	including	harboring	any	doubts	about	their	belief.		Once	you	have	faith,	she	warned,	members	of	your	family	might	die	because	devils	
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attack	them.		The	devils	are	trying	to	compete	with	God	and	make	people	afraid	to	continue	in	the	Church.		Even	as	relatives	die,	people	must	maintain	their	faith.		There	is	a	clear	sense	of	us	versus	the	outside	world,	good	versus	evil,	Christ	versus	the	Devil.	The	devils	are	always	eager	to	snatch	human	bodies,	but	the	battle	always	ends	in	the	triumph	of	the	good.		We	thus	have	a	strong	boundary	between	believers	and	the	evil	beyond,	a	boundary	defended	by	belief,	prayer,	and	the	Bible.		This	is	very	common	among	converted	Christian	communities	that	often	treat	all	the	indigenous	spirits	as	evil	(Meyer	1999;	Robbins	2004)	and	thus	define	Christian	identity	against	such	evils.		But	the	evils	still	need	to	exist.		They	keep	coming	back	in	the	forms	of	rituals,	dreams	and	personal	battles	such	as	Liu’s.13	Chen's	spirit	medium	network,	however,	seems	far	less	interested	in	integration.		After	all,	a	self	that	is	sometimes	Chen	and	sometimes	the	Buddha	is	not	particularly	pursuing	unity.		The	same	is	true	for	his	cured	disciples,	who	have	not	been	healed	by	becoming	psychically	integrated,	but	rather	by	learning	to	harness	the	alterity	within	them.		In	battling	the	evil	spirits,	the	evil	becomes	familiar	and	tamed.		It	is	like	a	cold	that	happens	from	time	to	time	but	can	never	be	completely	cured;	the	occasional	attacks	actually	boost	one’s	immune	system.		The	key	is	not	to	crush	evil	completely	but	to	control	it	and	prevent	it	from	doing	harm,	always	cultivating	one’s	own	power,	which	is	only	enhanced	by	proximity	to	evil.		
																																																								13	Our	analysis	highlights	the	religious	and	personal	contexts	of	evil	in	this	form	of	Christianity,	rather	than	the	possible	political	implications.		This	is	consistent	with	their	own	view	of	themselves.		As	another	one	of	their	preachers	said,	"We	don't	really	care	about	the	state.		We	only	care	about	eternity."		This	is	similar	to	the	conclusions	reached	in	Inouye's	(2011)	dissertation	about	the	True	Jesus	Church.	
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Liu's	church,	on	the	other	hand,	shapes	a	tightly	bounded	group,	surrounded	by	the	sharp	borders	of	baptism,	and	threatened	by	the	non-belief	that	encircles	them.		Both	the	church	and	the	spirit	medium	network	need	evil	in	order	to	pursue	good,	but	they	are	structured	in	utterly	different	ways	–	not	just	different	in	how	they	guard	their	boundaries,	but	in	how	they	perceive	the	nature	of	an	individual,	of	a	group,	and	of	boundaries	themselves.		
EVIL	CULTS,	LOVE,	AND	THE	BANAL	GOOD	It	was	actually	love	that	drove	us	to	evil.		Not	hot,	romantic	love	for	a	man	or	a	woman,	but	lukewarm,	vanilla	love	for	everyone	in	general	and	no	one	in	particular,	a	love	for	the	people	but	not	for	a	person.		We	had	been	working	for	several	years	on	social	constructions	of	the	good	in	China,	especially	as	seen	through	religious	philanthropy.		Everywhere	we	turned,	people	spoke	to	us	about	love	–	from	the	Amity	Foundation	(the	largest	Protestant	NGO	in	China)	to	preachers	in	small	churches,	from	the	globally	powerful	Buddhist	group	Tzu	Chi	(based	in	Taiwan	but	now	active	in	China	as	well)	to	private	conversations	with	monks.		Volunteers	and	donors,	government	officials	and	Communist	Party	cadres	all	told	us	about	how	people	should	be	driven	by	love:		universal	love	(兼爱),	broad	love	(博爱),	big	love	(大爱).		Such	a	love	is	quite	different	from	both	Confucian	and	high	socialist	versions	of	the	idea	(Lee	2007).		It	is,	as	Yan	Yunxiang	notes,	based	on	a	"new	individual	morality	of	rights	and	self-realization"	(Yan	2009,	22).		There	appears	to	be	no	evil	in	this	version	of	the	good.		Poverty,	illness,	and	disaster	are	unfortunate,	of	course,	but	those	are	merely	problems	to	be	ameliorated.		
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They	are	not	evils	themselves,	or	even	symptoms	of	an	underlying	evil.		This	“good”	is	banal	–	a	cliché	that	appears	flat	and	even	for	everyone,	everywhere.		Quite	unlike	the	spirit	medium	or	the	True	Jesus	preacher,	there	is	no	boundary	at	all	around	this	kind	of	imagined	goodness.		It	spreads	everywhere,	universally,	without	distinction.		It	is	banal	in	the	same	sense	that	Eichmann's	evil	was	banal	for	Hannah	Arendt,	through	its	utter	reduction	to	repetition	"word	for	word	[of]	the	same	stock	phrases	and	self-invented	clichés"	(Arendt	2006,	49).		That	is	why	our	various	encounters	with	evil	in	the	field	seemed	so	refreshing:		they	countered	the	reduction	of	goodness	to	a	generic	and	flat	universal,	endlessly	invoked	but	lacking	specific	content.		They	provide	an	escape	from	the	hegemony	of	this	kind	of	boundless	good	and	allow	alternative	ways	of	dealing	with	differences.		In	its	religious	policy,	the	Chinese	government	became	gradually	more	tolerant	of	a	religious	discourse	of	love	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	and	now	often	uses	the	stock	phrases	of	such	"love"	language	itself.		The	success	of	such	merging	of	discursive	worlds	was	clear	when	Ye	Xiaowen,	the	former	head	of	the	State	Administration	for	Religious	Affairs	(SARA),	praised	the	“positive	attitudes”	of	religions	such	as	the	“humanistic	Buddhism”	promoted	by	Zhao	Puchu,	the	then	lay	Buddhist	leader	of	the	Buddhist	Association	of	China	(BAC)	and	the	“service-oriented	and	ethical”	Christianity	promoted	by	the	late	Bishop	K.	H.	Ting,	first	chairperson	of	the	Three	Self	Patriotic	Movement,	president	of	the	China	Christian	Council,	and	founder	of	the	Amity	Foundation	(Ye	2007:	194).		In	2013,	when	we	were	doing	fieldwork	in	Jiangsu,	many	religious	groups	quoted	the	current	president	Xi	Jinping’s	speech	on	“positive	energy”	(正能量)	to	
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discuss	their	engagement	in	charitable	affairs.		Thus	among	religious	groups,	there	seems	to	be	an	urge	to	purify	themselves	from	the	negative	past	of	religions	and	remodel	themselves	on	something	positive	–	with	love	being	the	ultimate	positive	energy.		Bishop	Ting	had	long	put	love	at	the	center	of	Chinese	Christian	theology.		According	to	Wielander,	“The	central	tenet	of	[Ting’s]	theology	was	the	move	to	a	non-denominational	Chinese	church	built	on	the	core	message	that	God	is	Love”	(Wielander	2013,	49).14		This	replacing	of	Christianity's	millenarian	message	with	love	has	been	applauded	by	the	Chinese	government	as	well	(Wang	2010,	394).	Parallel	to	Ting,	the	Venerable	Cheng	Yen	(Zhengyan)	of	the	global	Buddhist	group	Tzu	Chi	has	been	promoting	“Spreading	Love”	(aisa	爱洒)	and	naming	all	its	large-scale	missions	as	“Da’ai”	(Big	Love)	since	2000.	Instead	of	loving	a	small	circle	of	family	or	friends,	one	should	love	all	living	things.		Other	Buddhist	groups	now	also	frequently	speak	of	love	as	a	fundamental	value,	although	the	term	occurs	very	rarely	in	Buddhist	sutras	and	even	sounds	counter-intuitive	to	the	Buddhist	idea	of	non-attachment.		This	discourse	of	love	has	become	dominant	across	religious	and	national	lines	since	the	1980s.		The	two	of	us	organized	several	interdenominational	focus	groups	on	religious	philanthropy.15		When	we	asked	participants	at	one	of	them	their	
																																																								14	Wielander	(2013,	51–53)	further	shows	that	the	CCP’s	extensive	official	writings	on	harmonious	society	often	refer	to	Western	civilization,	and	specifically	to	Christian	universal	love,	as	one	of	the	idea's	many	sources,	and	they	re-interpret	Confucian	ren	(仁,	"benevolence")	as	airen	(爱人)	“loving	people.”		15	Both	took	place	in	spring	2014,	one	in	Nanjing	and	one	in	Shanghai.		They	were	convened	jointly	by	the	authors.		The	group	in	Nanjing	consisted	of	locally	important	clerics	from	four	of	the	recognized	religions,	all	involved	in	charitable	work.		There	were	also	leading	lay	Protestant	and	Buddhist	leaders	involved	in	informal	charity.		The	group	in	Shanghai	was	a	similar	selection	of	religious	leaders	from	Shanghai	and	Suzhou,	with	the	addition	of	some	retired	Religious	Affairs	officials.		
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motivations	for	social	service	provision,	the	representative	from	that	city's	YMCA	said	that	the	spirit	of	universal	love	(博爱)	in	Christianity	is	the	key:		“It's	important	to	show	an	inclusive	love.”		During	the	same	event	Pastor	Li	from	the	official	Three	Self	Protestant	church	also	put	love	at	the	core	of	their	message.		An	employee	at	a	Buddhist-inspired	vegetarian	restaurant	gave	us	a	brochure	called	“guarding	our	home	with	love”	(用爱守护家园),	and	explained	that	the	greatest	love	was	not	killing	(animals).		Using	love	as	the	dominant	discourse	makes	it	possible	for	these	groups	to	reach	the	general	public,	instead	of	being	restricted	by	specific	theological	terms	that	are	only	familiar	to	insiders.		After	all,	who	is	going	to	reject	love?		Love	enables	the	religious	groups	to	dialogue	on	the	same	platform	with	other	parties	engaged	in	social	service	provision:		the	state	and	the	NGOs.		It	lets	them	claim	common	ground	with	one	another,	pointing	to	their	common	love	without	highlighting	their	deep	theological	and	ideological	differences;	it	is	reduced	to	banality,	which	is	exactly	what	makes	it	so	useful.	Love	is	not	only	used	in	the	philanthropic	discourses	of	religions.	In	July	2014,	one	of	us	attended	a	True	Jesus	prayer	group	for	college	students	who	were	not	members	of	the	church.		The	preacher	spoke	about	love,	from	small	love	to	big	love	and	God’s	love.		This	was	different	from	the	tone	during	regular	True	Jesus	services,	and	the	staff	explained	later	that	the	talk	of	love	(and	the	avoidance	of	speaking	in	tongues)	was	to	appeal	to	an	audience	that	did	not	yet	believe	–	the	vagueness	of	love	was	what	made	it	useful.		During	the	event	one	young	woman	
																																																																																																																																																																					Catholics	did	not	attend	either	group,	probably	due	to	political	sensitivities	at	that	moment.		There	were	about	a	dozen	participants	in	each	group.	
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offered	her	testimonial	in	tears.		Not	shed	in	sadness,	she	said,	but	because	the	discussion	of	love	had	recalled	the	love	of	her	parents	for	her,	which	she	had	ignored	for	so	long,	until	she	found	Jesus.		At	the	end,	several	of	us	were	also	given	little	cross-shaped	key	chains	that	said,	in	English	and	Chinese,	"CROSS;	Love	never	fails	(爱是永不止息).”		They	used	"love"	on	this	occasion	exactly	because	it	could	appeal	to	anyone,	though	it	revealed	little	of	the	heart	of	this	specific	group.		Talk	of	evil,	like	speaking	in	tongues,	was	reserved	for	people	already	committed	to	this	church.	This	power	of	love	echoes	what	Pastor	Zhang	in	Hangzhou	told	us	in	May	2014:		"Our	main	service	principle	is	love,	Jesus's	love."	In	Buddhism	too,	the	millenarian	aspect	of	Buddhism	was	rarely	mentioned	during	our	field	research.		Instead,	they	emphasized	the	positive	aspect	of	big	love	or	a	loving	heart	(爱心).		The	positive	impact	of	Buddhism	on	people’s	lives	was	reiterated,	through	loving	animals	and	loving	the	environment	(being	vegetarian),	loving	oneself	(being	a	more	enlightened	person),	and	giving	a	loving	heart	to	people	in	need	(being	a	volunteer).	The	beginnings	of	this	discourse	of	love	among	religious	groups	coincided	with	state	efforts	in	the	construction	of	Socialist	morality.		During	the	Cultural	Revolution,	love	was	an	important	value,	but	should	only	exist	on	the	basis	of	class;	it	could	not	extend	to	people	like	capitalists.		In	the	softening	of	the	1980s,	official	Socialist	morality	began	to	relax	the	primacy	of	class,	and	we	began	to	see	more	nationalist	love	slogans	like	the	ubiquitous	"love	the	country	and	love	the	people"	(爱祖国爱人民).		A	religious	variation	of	this	first	appeared	in	1993	in	the	
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"Regulations	for	the	Buddhist	Association	of	China"	–	"love	the	country	and	love	the	religion"	(爱国爱教).		By	1996	it	had	been	emulated	in	the	"Regulations	for	the	China	Christian	Council."		This	slogan	is	now	repeated	dutifully	by	all	five	religions	at	nearly	every	official	religious	event.		It	does	not	represent	a	fundamental	change	in	religious	attitudes	so	much	as	a	change	in	the	Party-state's	ever-widening	use	of	love	discourse.		As	the	scope	of	love	has	become	ever	wider	and	ever	more	vague,	it	has	created	an	opportunity	for	religions	to	justify	themselves	in	the	state's	terms	while	still	emphasizing	their	moral	commitment	as	religions.	This	Party-based	embrace	of	love	infiltrates	secular	life	as	well.		For	instance,	a	series	of	Morality	Lecture	Halls	(道德讲堂)	have	appeared	throughout	China	since	2012,	run	by	the	Propaganda	Bureau.		One	of	us	was	brought	to	such	an	occasion	in	Changzhou	(one	of	southern	Jiangsu's	larger	cities)	and	given	a	book	of	Moral	Stories	about	the	"moral	heroes"	they	celebrate	at	their	events	every	Sunday.		One	story	is	called	“The	Love	of	an	Angel”	(天使的爱):		Ding	Chenli	at	age	18	decided	to	devote	herself	to	leprosy	work.		She	almost	gave	up	after	the	first	day,	when	she	saw	and	smelled	how	awful	everything	was,	but	the	strength	of	love	kept	her	committed.		She	wrote:	“Love	let	me	find	the	fulcrum	for	my	work;	love	let	me	find	the	coordinates	of	human	life.		I	am	willing	to	be	love’s	angel	forever,	bringing	the	light	of	hope	to	ever	more	patients”	(Changzhou	City	Civilization	Office	(常州市文明办)	2013,	9).		Again,	in	this	narrative	the	evils	(of	diseases	or	other	misfortune)	are	pushed	aside	by	the	(positive)	discourse	of	love.		Yet	evil	does	exist,	even	in	this	view	of	love-as-everything.		This	was	obvious	when	the	discourse	of	love	was	explicitly	class-based:		people	and	classes	outside	
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the	circle	of	proper	love	constituted	an	enemy	to	be	destroyed,	and	the	Cultural	Revolution	often	used	the	popular	religious	imagery	of	demonic	evil	to	describe	these	enemies.		Nevertheless,	as	we	hope	to	show	in	the	rest	of	this	section,	the	ever-broadening	circles	of	love	in	the	past	few	decades	also	imply	a	world	beyond	the	love,	which	can	only	be	stamped	out.		In	religious	circles	this	has	taken	the	form	of	attacks	on	"evil	cults"	(邪教).	In	comparison	to	the	world	with	evil	(seen,	rather	differently,	in	both	the	spirit	medium	and	the	preacher),	the	world	without	evil	cannot	tolerate	evil's	existence	and	often	tries	to	eliminate	it	through	even	more	drastic	means	than	the	evil	itself	–	violence,	physical	or	symbolic,	in	the	name	of	good	against	evil.		In	this	way	an	imagined	world	without	boundaries	nevertheless	draws	new	boundaries,	all	the	more	insidious	for	being	denied.		Thus	all	the	loving	talk	has	not	prevented	either	the	state	or	religious	groups	from	fiercely	condemning	"evil	cults."		The	state	crushing	of	Falun	Gong	in	1999	and	the	new	campaign	in	2014	against	the	cult	of	“Almighty	God”	(全能神)	are	examples.	As	the	leader	of	SARA,	Ye	Xiaowen	emphasized	that	cults	are	not	religions	and	therefore	do	not	enjoy	the	legal	protections	of	religious	groups	(Ye	2007,	198–202).		In	1999,	during	the	aftermath	of	the	Falun	Gong	demonstrations,	the	high	court	first	defined	evil	cults	as	illegal	organizations	(Wang	2010,	392).		Note	that	this	was	only	a	few	years	after	love	had	been	embraced	by	all	the	religions	as	a	slogan.		Wang	Zuoan,	the	new	head	of	SARA,	re-asserted	that	cults	are	not	religions	(2010:393)	and	therefore	could	be	condemned	with	legitimacy.		By	creating	an	illegal	category	of	“evil”	cults,	the	state	has	been	able	to	condemn	the	evil	
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unconditionally.		This	way	of	pushing	“evil”	completely	out	leaves	no	room	for	negotiation	or	co-existence.		Unlike	the	spirit	medium	and	the	preacher,	who	require	the	continued	existence	of	evil,	this	vision	intends	to	annihilate	"evil,"	and	anything	that	does	not	accept	the	embrace	of	its	love.	The	mainstream	religious	groups,	by	accepting	this	banal	love,	have	been	just	as	active	in	this	process.		Buddhist	groups	were	among	the	first	to	condemn	Falun	Gong,	and	used	the	term	"evil	cults"	before	the	state	adopted	it.		In	1996,	three	years	before	the	government	launched	the	full	scale	campaign	against	Falun	Gong,	the	Buddhist	Association	in	Taizhou	(Zhejiang	Province)	published	a	series	of	articles	in	
Taizhou	Buddhism,	denouncing	the	group	as	an	“evil	cult	and	demonic	practice”	(邪
教魔功).		In	early	1998,	the	Buddhist	Association	of	China	officially	assessed	Falun	Gong	as	“an	outside	religion	with	a	pretense	of	Buddhism”	(附佛外道).		With	the	approval	of	Zhao	Puchu,	the	chair	of	BAC,	a	lay	Buddhist	published	Buddhist	Qigong	
and	Falun	Gong	(1998),	which	was	the	first	book-length	criticism	of	the	group,	appearing	a	year	before	the	government	made	its	formal	announcement.		After	the	central	government	launched	its	war	against	Falun	Gong,	the	other	four	state-sanctioned	religions	followed	suit	and	condemned	the	group	in	public	as	an	evil	cult	(Wang	2010,	393-395).		Falun	Gong	is	not	the	only	"evil	cult"	that	is	under	attack.		For	instance,	during	the	hype	over	the	missing	Malaysian	airliner	in	2014,	many	stories	circulated	in	Chinese	social	media	regarding	the	cause	of	such	a	disaster.		One	of	them	came	to	us	from	a	monastic	Jiangsu	Buddhist	source,	very	much	involved	in	philanthropic	goodness,	alluding	to	the	connection	between	the	misfortune	and	a	group	of	Chinese	
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believers	on	the	plane,	who	had	gone	on	a	healing	trip	to	Malaysia	held	by	a	controversial	Buddhist	group	called	“Xinling	Famen”	(心灵法门),	led	by	the	Malaysian	Chinese	Lu	Junhong.		In	2014,	the	BAC	delivered	a	message	openly	calling	Xinling	Famen	“an	outside	religion	under	the	pretense	of	Buddhism”	(附佛外道).		When	asked	what	Buddhists	consider	to	be	an	evil	cult,	two	informants	(interviewed	separately	by	each	of	us;	one	was	a	senior	nun	who	had	reposted	the	story	about	the	airliner	to	social	media)	said	it	is	when	the	leader	puts	him/herself	up	as	the	sacred	person,	such	as	Amitabha	or	the	Buddha	himself,	which	should	never	happen	in	Buddhism.		This	coincides	with	the	state	definition	of	a	cult	as	“an	illegal	organization	that	uses	the	name	of	religion	or	Qigong	to	establish	and	sacralize	the	leader,	create	superstitious	or	evil	messages	to	control	its	members	and	harm	the	society”	(Wang	2010,	392).	Some	Christians	have	their	own	opinions	about	what	a	cult	is.		The	mother	of	a	friend	of	ours	has	been	a	member	of	a	family	church	(in	the	Little	Flock	tradition)	for	decades.		She	said	that	all	other	religions	are	evil	cults,	including	other	kinds	of	Christianities	that	do	not	belong	to	her	tradition.		A	few	minutes	later	she	clarified	by	saying	that	Islam	and	Buddhism	are	indeed	evil	cults,	but	other	kinds	of	Christianities	are	only	“outside	teachings”	(外教).		Though	in	the	end	she	used	a	more	sensitive	touch	to	differentiate	between	evil	cults	and	outside	teachings,	the	boundary	is	clearly	drawn	between	the	“good”	and	“religion”	on	one	side,	and	evil	cults	or	outside	teachings	on	the	other.		Many	promoters	of	the	ideals	of	big	love	and	universal	goodness	are	the	very	ones	who	also	speak	aggressively	about	evil.		It	
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seems	that	with	the	increasing	emphasis	on	love	by	all	the	religions,	the	gap	between	the	good	and	evil	is	all	the	more	insurmountable.	Love	–	the	ultimate	good	and	the	positive	energy	–	has	been	embraced	by	religious	groups,	the	government	and	non-governmental	sectors	as	an	all-encompassing	and	universal	value	that	should	appeal	to	all.		When	religious	groups	reach	out	to	non-devotees	with	their	messages	of	charity	and	philanthropy,	when	the	state	demands	religions	and	its	people	to	show	more	love	toward	it	and	toward	one	another,	and	when	nongovernmental	organizations	ask	for	loving	hearts	to	contribute	to	the	less	fortunate	of	society,	helpless	animals	and	innocent	nature,	love	transcends	all	boundaries.		It	is	the	most	powerful	discourse	and	denies	refusal.		After	all,	what	else	except	absolute	evil	rejects	such	love?		Such	an	evil	can	only	be	exterminated.		There	is	no	room	to	tolerate	any	other	visions	of	possible	loves	when	love	(of	country,	of	religion,	of	humanity)	is	unbounded	and	equal	for	all,	everywhere,	when	it	is	reduced	to	banal	repetitions	of	stock	phrases.		It	hardly	matters	whether	such	repetitions	are	done	sincerely	or	cynically;	the	implications	of	the	discursive	world	are	the	same	either	way.	The	world	of	the	spirit	medium	imagines	a	localized	network	for	which	he	can	channel	and	control	the	inevitable	forces	of	evil.		The	True	Jesus	followers	instead	imagine	an	embattled	island	of	goodness	defined	against	the	evil	that	pushes	against	its	barricades.		For	banal	goodness,	however,	there	are	no	acceptable	boundaries;	society	is	global	and	offers	no	resistance	to	its	continual	expansion.		When	this	fantasy	is	challenged,	however,	the	evil	of	refusal	is	absolute	unless	it	can	be	obliterated	–	overtaken	and	absorbed	by	love.		Such	a	vision	of	goodness	absorbs	
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or	annihilates	difference	but	does	not	tolerate	it.		The	banal	good	is	not	only	without	content;	it	also	destroys.	That	is,	by	attempting	to	transcend	boundaries,	the	banal	goodness	of	universal	love	creates	even	more	boundaries.		In	Civilization	and	its	Discontents,	Freud	reminds	us	that	“a	love	that	does	not	discriminate	seems	to	me	to	forfeit	a	part	of	its	own	value	by	doing	an	injustice	to	its	object;	and	secondly,	not	all	men	are	worthy	of	love”	(Freud	1962,	49).		In	other	words,	universal	love	is	no	longer	love.		Freud	continues,	“It	is	always	possible	to	find	together	a	considerable	number	of	people	in	love,	so	long	as	there	are	other	people	left	over	to	receive	the	manifestations	of	their	aggressiveness”	(Freud	1962,	61).		This	further	points	to	the	dangerous,	hegemonic	and	even	violent	aspect	of	banal	love,	just	as	we	saw	above	in	the	cases	where	simultaneous	emphases	on	love	and	the	relentless	(sometimes	violent)	condemnation	of	evil	coexist	in	the	same	religious	and	government	bodies.		A	love-filled	world	traps	us	in	the	goodness	that	has	no	room	for	evil,	and	where	evil	must	thus	be	permanently	destroyed.		This	most	"modern"	of	outlooks	may	thus	be	the	one	least	able	to	accept	the	existence	of	evil,	and	thus	of	genuine	difference.	
CONCLUDING	THOUGHTS	All	three	cases	are	inseparable	from	the	experiences	of	people	in	southern	Jiangsu,	who	live	in	a	strongly	market-oriented	and	consumerist	economy,	surrounded	by	a	highly	urbanized	environment,	and	tied	to	global	media	trends.		All	of	them	call	on	ideas	with	very	long	histories	in	China	(animal	spirits,	ghosts,	evil	cults),	but	understood	only	in	relation	to	contemporary	events.		That	is,	none	of	our	
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cases	pits	tradition	against	modernity.		All	three	goods/evils	make	sense	of	the	contemporary	world	through	available	resources,	but	they	do	so	differently.	The	spirit	medium	Chen	is	a	literal	mediator	–	between	humans	and	spirits	of	course,	but	more	importantly	between	good	and	evil.		He	stands	at	the	crossroads,	not	just	channeling	the	power	of	gods	to	control	"evil	things,"	but	also	making	offerings	to	the	goddess	at	the	heart	of	evil.		Great	power	of	any	kind	has	the	potential	for	both	good	and	evil;	it	is	frightening.		In	this	image	of	good/evil	the	boundary	between	them	is	ambiguous	and	shifting.		Evil	here	appears	as	the	self-maximizing	individual,	both	in	the	image	of	the	cultivating	monkey	demon	and	of	the	"dark	loans"	one	could	get	at	Shangfang	Mountain.		Yet,	as	we	have	argued,	this	is	not	the	critique	of	the	market	that	Taussig	sees	in	Colombian	devil	worship,	especially	in	this	region	with	many	centuries	of	a	thriving	commodity	economy.	The	medium's	boundary	is	not	stark	or	absolute,	but	negotiable	and	blurred.		The	goal	is	not	to	demolish	evil	forever,	but	to	make	one's	peace	with	its	necessity.		It	is	a	rejection	of	the	banal	love	story,	or	at	least	a	complete	alternative	to	it,	because	it	recognizes	the	need	to	deal	with	evil	daily,	to	respect	its	strength	while	keeping	it	under	control.		By	the	same	token,	we	might	say	that	evil	also	keeps	the	good	in	check,	never	allowing	the	possibility	that	it	could	become	a	total	world	of	goodness,	in	which	the	good	can	only	be	banal	because	it	has	no	more	evil.	In	this	view,	the	past	is	not	more	moral	than	the	present,	and	evil	is	not	less	moral	than	the	forces	harnessing	it.	The	True	Jesus	preacher,	on	the	other	hand,	is	not	so	much	mediating	as	differentiating.		For	her,	as	for	many	in	her	congregation,	the	demarcation	and	
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separation	from	evil	is	a	daily	necessity.		The	battle	against	evil	allows	them	to	integrate	internally,	both	as	individuals	and	as	a	group.		This	is,	however,	also	what	makes	the	state	nervous	about	them.		The	state,	and	the	Three	Self	Protestant	movement	it	sponsors,	want	to	rid	Chinese	Christians	of	denominations	and	unite	them	under	the	big	banner	of	love	theology.		It	is	the	battle	against	evil	that	marks	the	True	Jesus	church's	separateness	from	"outside	religions,"	including	other	Christians.		Recall	that	the	ghosts	were	not	so	much	trying	to	attack	Liu's	Christianity	as	her	conversion	to	True	Jesus	practices.		Had	they	been	victorious,	she	would	still	be	a	Presbyterian.	The	True	Jesus	church	differentiates	from	evil	by	constantly	recognizing	it;	evil	can	never	be	denied	or	ignored.		For	them	good	and	evil	remain	connected,	although	in	a	very	different	way	from	the	spirit	medium	group.		The	ambiguous	boundary	in	Chen's	practice	is	here	instead	a	sharply	drawn	divide,	which	must	constantly	be	faced.		This	resonates	with	some	other	Christian	cases,	for	instance	as	Harris	reports	from	highland	Bolivia,	where	converts	live	in	fear	of	vengeance	from	the	ancestors	they	no	longer	worship	(Harris	2006).		By	remaining	in	sight,	these	dangerous	outside	forces	allow	the	group	to	define	itself	clearly.		Liu	and	her	True	Jesus	followers	demarcate	the	boundary;	they	probe	it,	actively	feel	its	presence,	and	reinforce	it	constantly.		To	a	certain	degree,	parallels	can	be	found	in	some	underground	churches’	attitude	toward	the	Chinese	state,	which	for	them	constitutes	the	evil.		The	existence	of	evil	is	necessary	for	the	groups’	legitimacy	as	the	truer	church	in	contrast	to	the	state-sanctioned	church.		Again,	the	evil	defines	the	good.	One	cannot	make	a	moral	decision	without	consideration	of	evil.	
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Only	the	discourse	of	banal	love	makes	no	direct	mention	of	evil	–	there	appears	to	be	no	boundary	at	all,	just	the	endless	expanse	of	banal	love.		This	infinite	love	without	evil	may	be	the	result	of	two	interrelated	processes.		One	is	the	post-Enlightenment	rise	of	the	idea	that	human	beings	are	autonomous	individuals	each	equal	to	the	other	and	thus	fundamentally	identical	to	each	other.		Differences	become	irrelevant	or	private.		These	ideas	evolved	toward	a	concept	of	universal	philanthropy	especially	during	the	paleo-liberal	heyday	of	the	laissez-faire	nineteenth	century.		During	this	period	many	North	American	and	European	Christian	congregations	undertook	broad	charitable	projects	for	the	first	time,	and	we	saw	the	beginnings	of	international	NGOs	like	the	Red	Cross,	which	are	now	so	important.		This	shift	from	private	charity	(love	of	one's	own	neighbors	or	social	groups)	to	public	philanthropy	(love	for	all	mankind)	has	happened	in	China	as	well,	especially	beginning	in	the	1990s.		It	is	no	coincidence	that	the	newly	expanded	role	for	charity	correlates	with	the	state's	step	back	from	total	welfare	responsibility,	and	with	its	broadened	discourse	of	love.16		The	expansion	of	charity	has	encouraged	a	love	for	all	under	an	umbrella	of	goodness	so	universal	that	it	leaves	no	room	for	genuine	otherness,	for	the	evil	that	cannot	be	loved.	The	second	process	is	the	Chinese	state's	post-Reform	need	to	find	a	discursive	field	that	everyone	can	share.		"Love"	and	"goodness"	are	ideal	for	this,	especially	when	they	become	reduced	to	formulas	so	empty	that	everyone	can	repeat	them	while	papering	over	their	real	differences.		For	instance,	we	asked	a	focus	group	of	religious	leaders	whether	the	"good"	that	each	of	them	pursued	was																																																									16	This	is	the	topic	of	a	book-length	manuscript	currently	being	completed,	written	jointly	by	C.	Julia	Huang	and	the	authors	of	this	article,	with	Lizhu	Fan.	
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the	same	as	the	others.		This	was	initially	greeted	with	bafflement	–	of	course	it	was	the	same,	good	is	good.		But	when	we	asked	more	specifically	whether	the	Christians	thought	releasing	captive	animals	counted	as	doing	good,	or	asked	Buddhists	whether	saving	souls	counted	as	good,	our	informants	quickly	parted	ways.		Slogans	like	"love	the	country,	love	the	religion,"	endlessly	repeated,	make	everyone	sound	the	same,	but	cover	over	their	very	real	differences.		This	is	the	banality	of	good:		a	good	without	evil,	a	good	reduced	to	endless	reiterations	of	a	few	stock	phrases.	As	we	have	discussed,	though,	evil	still	lurks	unseen	in	the	gaps	left	by	this	discourse	of	banal	love,	even	if	religious	leaders	are	simply	repeating	this	discourse	to	curry	political	favor.		Perhaps	Freud	was	right	that	the	bigger	the	embrace	of	universal	love,	the	greater	the	potential	for	hate	of	that	which	stands	beyond	its	grasp.		That	is	probably	why	the	Chinese	state	has	recently	become	ever	more	strident	in	attacking	terrorism	or	cults,	while	pouring	out	love	through	constant	morality	campaigns.		Here	there	is	no	way	to	cross	the	boundary,	no	way	to	build	a	bridge.		It	is	as	if	the	pathway	between	good	and	evil	–	so	vital,	in	different	ways,	to	the	spirit	medium	and	the	preacher	–	had	become	blocked.		The	invisible	boundary	of	love	is	absolute	exactly	because	it	is	denied:		we	love	each	other	and	bomb	the	terrorists;	religions	do	“good”	and	annihilate	"evil	cults."	These	cases	show	the	incompleteness	of	the	post-Enlightenment	project	of	boundaryless	equality.17		In	part,	boundaries	show	up	after	all,	but	in	an	insidious	way	because	this	image	can	no	longer	connect	to	what	is	on	the	other	side	of	the	boundary.		Just	as	importantly,	that	project	is	challenged	and	supplemented	in																																																									17	We	are	drawing	here	in	part	on	the	analysis	in	Seligman	and	Weller	(2012).	
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contemporary	China	by	fundamentally	different	ways	of	thinking	about	the	boundary	itself:		the	ambiguous	and	mediated	boundary	of	Chen's	monkey	demon,	and	the	defining	difference	of	Liu's	ghosts.		Both	of	these	offer	alternatives	to	the	absolute	rift	between	good	and	evil	that	the	dominant	narrative	suggests.		We	cannot	reduce	morality	to	a	simple	function	of	political	economy,	since	here	we	have	people	in	largely	similar	positions	drawing	on	different	moralities.18		Our	cases	demonstrate	a	continuation	of	multiple	moral	possibilities	instead	of	the	hegemony	of	just	one.		These	potentially	alternative	moralities,	as	the	monkey	demon	said,	are	"only	a	little	bit	weaker"	than	the	dominant	discourse,	and	show	every	sign	of	staying	around	to	fight	again.		Allowing	room	for	evil	may	be	the	only	way	to	be	moral.		
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:		We	are	grateful	to	the	anthropologists	Bai	Li	and	Yang	Der-Ruey	for	their	help	making	fieldwork	connections.		We	also	want	to	thank	participants	in	sessions	at	the	American	Anthropological	Association	meetings	and	at	Harvard	University's	Fairbank	Center	for	their	helpful	feedback.		We	are	especially	grateful	to	Charles	Lindholm,	Joel	Robbins,	and	several	anonymous	readers	for	their	very	generous	comments	on	earlier	drafts.		Finally,	we	thank	the	Harvard-Yenching	Institute,	whose	fellowship	to	Keping	Wu	allowed	us	to	collaborate	on	the	writing	in	person.		 	
																																																								18	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	approach	favored	by	many	of	the	essays	collected	in	Clough	and	Mitchell	(2001).	
	 38	
LIST	OF	REFERENCES		ARENDT,	HANNAH.	2006.	Eichmann	in	Jerusalem:	A	Report	on	the	Banality	of	Evil.	New	York:	Penguin	Classics.	CHANGZHOU	CITY	CIVILIZATION	OFFICE	常州市文明办.	2013.	Daode	Gushi	(er)	道德故事(
二)	[Morality	Stories,	vol.	2].	Changzhou:	n.p.	CLOUGH,	PAUL,	and	JON	P.	MITCHELL,	eds.	2001.	Powers	of	Good	and	Evil:	Social	
Transformation	and	Popular	Belief.	New	York:	Berghahn	Books.	DOUGLAS,	MARY.	1966.	Purity	and	Danger:	Concepts	of	Pollution	and	Taboo.	London:	Routledge	&	Kegan	Paul.	FEI,	XIAOTONG.	1992.	From	the	Soil:	The	Foundations	of	Chinese	Society.	Translated	by	Gary	G.	Hamilton	and	Wang	Zheng.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press.	FREUD,	SIGMUND.	1962.	Civilization	and	Its	Discontents.	Translated	by	James	Strachey.	New	York:	W.W.	Norton.	GESCHIERE,	PETER.	1997.	The	Modernity	of	Witchcraft:	Politics	and	the	Occult	in	
Postcolonial	Africa.	Charlottesville,	VA:	University	of	Virginia	Press.	GUO,	QITAO.	2003.	Exorcism	and	Money:	The	Symbolic	World	of	the	Five-Fury	Spirits	in	
Late	Imperial	China.	Berkeley:	Institute	of	East	Asian	Studies.	HARRIS,	OLIVIA.	2006.	“The	Eternal	Return	of	Conversion:	Christianity	as	a	Contested	Domain	in	Highland	Bolivia.”	In	Anthropology	of	Christianity,	ed.	Fenella	Cannell,	51–76.	Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press.	INOUYE,	MELISSA.	2011.	“Miraculous	Mundane:	The	True	Jesus	Church	and	Chinese	Christianity	in	the	Twentieth	Century.”	PhD	diss.,	Harvard	University.	
	 39	
KANG,	XIAOFEI.	2005.	The	Cult	of	the	Fox:	Power,	Gender,	and	Popular	Religion	in	Late	
Imperial	and	Modern	China.	New	York:	Columbia	University	Press.	KUHN,	PHILIP	A.	1992.	Soulstealers:	The	Chinese	Sorcery	Scare	of	1768.	Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press.	LAIDLAW,	JAMES.	2014.	The	Subject	of	Virtue:	An	Anthropology	of	Ethics	and	Freedom.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	LEE,	HAIYAN.	2007.	Revolution	of	the	Heart:	A	Genealogy	of	Love	in	China,	1900-1950.	Stanford,	CA:	Stanford	University	Press.		LIAN,	XI.	2010.	Redeemed	by	Fire:	The	Rise	of	Popular	Christianity	in	Modern	China.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press.	MACFARLANE,	ALAN.	1985.	“The	Root	of	All	Evil.”	In	The	Anthropology	of	Evil,	ed.	David	Parkin,	57–76.	Oxford:	Blackwell.	MEYER,	BIRGIT.	1999.	Translating	the	Devil:	Religion	and	Modernity	Among	the	Ewe	in	
Ghana.	Trenton,	NJ:	Africa	World	Press.	OTTO,	RUDOLF.	1958.	The	Idea	of	the	Holy.	Translated	by	John	W.	Harvey.	2	edition.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	PUETT,	MICHAEL.	2010.	“Ritualization	as	Domestication:	Ritual	Theory	from	Classical	China.”	In	Ritual	Dynamics	and	the	Science	of	Ritual,	ed.	Axel	Michaels,	vol.	1:365–76.	Wiesbaden:	Harrassowitz	Verlag.	ROBBINS,	JOEL.	2004.	Becoming	Sinners:	Christianity	and	Moral	Torment	in	a	Papua	
New	Guinea	Society.	Berkeley,	Calif:	University	of	California	Press.	———.	2007.	“Between	Reproduction	and	Freedom:	Morality,	Value,	and	Radical	Cultural	Change.”	Ethnos	72(3):293–314.	
	 40	
SELIGMAN,	ADAM	B.,	and	ROBERT	P.	WELLER.	2012.	Rethinking	Pluralism:		Ritual,	
Experience,	and	Ambiguity.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	SHAHAR,	MEIR.	1992.	“The	Lingyin	Si	Monkey	Disciples	and	The	Origins	of	Sun	Wukong.”	Harvard	Journal	of	Asiatic	Studies	52(1):193–224.	SHAHAR,	MEIR,	and	ROBERT	P	WELLER.	1996.	Unruly	Gods:	Divinity	and	Society	in	China.	Honolulu:	University	of	Hawaiʻi	Press.	SZONYI,	MICHAEL.	1997.	“The	Illusion	of	Standardizing	the	Gods:	The	Cult	of	the	Five	Emperors	in	Late	Imperial	China.”	Journal	of	Asian	Studies	56(1):113–35.	TAUSSIG,	MICHAEL	T.	1980.	The	Devil	and	Commodity	Fetishism	in	South	America.	Chapel	Hill,	NC:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press.	
VON	GLAHN,	RICHARD.	2004.	The	Sinister	Way:	The	Divine	and	the	Demonic	in	Chinese	
Religious	Culture.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press.	WANG,	ZUOAN	王作安.	2010.	Zhongguo	Zongjiao	Wenti	He	Zongjiao	Zhengce	中国宗教
问题和宗教政策	[Religious	Problems	and	Religious	Policies	in	China].	Beijing:	Religious	Culture	Publishing	House	宗教文化出版社.	WELLER,	ROBERT	P.	1994.	Resistance,	Chaos,	and	Control	in	China:	Taiping	Rebels,	
Taiwanese	Ghosts,	and	Tiananmen.	Seattle:	University	of	Washington	Press.	WIELANDER,	GERDA.	2013.	Christian	Values	in	Communist	China.	New	York:	Routledge.	YAN,	YUNXIANG.	2009.	“The	Good	Samaritan’s	New	Trouble:	A	Study	of	the	Changing	Moral	Landscape	in	Contemporary	China.”	Social	Anthropology	17(1):9–24.	———.	2011a.	“The	Changing	Moral	Landscape.”	In	Deep	China:	The	Moral	Life	of	the	
Person,	by	Arthur	Kleinman,	Yunxiang	Yan,	Jing	Jun,	Sing	Lee,	Everett	Zhang,	
	 41	
Pan	Tianshu,	Wu	Fei,	and	Guo	Jinhua,	36–77.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press.	———.	2011b.	“How	Far	Away	Can	We	Move	from	Durkheim?	—	Reflections	on	the	New	Anthropology	of	Morality.”	Anthropology	of	This	Century,	no.	2	(October),	http://aotcpress.com/articles/move-durkheim-reflections-anthropology-morality/.	YE,	XIAOWEN	叶小文.	2007.	Zongjiao	Wenti:	Zenmo	Kan,	Zenmo	Ban	宗教问题：怎么
看怎么办	[Religious	Questions:	How	to	View	Them	and	How	to	Deal	with	
Them].	Beijing:	Religious	Culture	Publishing	House	宗教文化出版社.		
